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Fiduciary Discretion
D. GORDON SMITH* & JORDAN C. LEEt
Discretion is an important feature of all contractual relationships. In this
Article, we rely on incomplete contract theory to motivate our study of
discretion in fiduciary relationships. We make two contributions to the
substantial literature on fiduciary law. First, we describe the role offiduciary
law as "boundary enforcement, " and we urge courts to honor the appropriate
exercise of discretion by fiduciaries, even when the beneficiary or the judge
might perceive a preferable action after the fact. Second, we answer the
question, how should a court define the boundaries offiduciary discretion? We
observe that courts often define these boundaries by reference to industry
customs and social norms. We also defend this as the most sensible and
coherent approach to boundary enforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Discretion is an important feature of all contractual relationships. A
complete contract would specify all obligations of all parties under every
conceivable circumstance,' leaving no room for discretion or judgment. Real-
world contracts are incomplete, 2 giving one or more of the parties some
* Glen L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. We are grateful to Afra Afsharipour, Bobby Bartlett, Matt Bodie, Brian
Broughman, Steve Davidoff, Andrew Gold, Joan Heminway, Christine Hurt, Joe Orien,
Usha Rodrigues, Drew Smith, and Tina Stark for assistance in developing this Article.
t J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
1 See Steven Shavell, Contracts, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 436, 436 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("A contract is said to be complete if the
list of conditions on which actions are based is exhaustive, that is, if the contract provides
explicitly for all possible conditions.").
2 Although he did not use the term "incomplete contract," Ronald Coase identified the
problem of incompleteness in his seminal piece on the theory of the firm. See R.H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391 (1937) ("[O]wing to the difficulty of
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discretion over performance. 3 In this Article, we rely on incomplete contract
theory to motivate our study of discretion in fiduciary relationships. 4
Discretion implies the possibility of choice, which in turn calls for the
exercise of judgment.5 Discretion is universally recognized as an essential
aspect of fiduciary relationships.6 We contend that the grant of discretion in
forecasting, the longer the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or
service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to
specify what the other contracting party is expected to do.").
Oliver Williamson coined the term "contractual incompleteness." Oliver E.
Williamson, The Vertical Integration ofProduction: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
EcON. REv. 112, 117 (1971). Williamson later embraced the concept of "bounded
rationality" as described by Herbert Simon: "The capacity of the human mind for
formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world. . . ."
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 198 (1957); see OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRuST IMPLICATIONS 31-33
(1975).
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, economists assume that complete
contracts do not exist in the real world. See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS,
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 160 (1992) ("Because real people are only
boundedly rational, complete contracts that specify what they will do in every conceivable
circumstance are impossible to negotiate and write.").
3 See Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the
Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 182 (2011)
("When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all uses of an asset can be specified
in advance, any contract negotiated in advance must leave some discretion over the use of
the assets.").
4 For an excellent introduction to incomplete contract theory, see PATRICK BOLTON &
MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY (2005). In this Article, we apply contractualist
reasoning to fiduciary relationships, but we recognize, as Paul Miller observes, that "not all
fiduciary relationships are established through contract." Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary
Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 982 (2013). The insights from incomplete contract theory that
we rely on in this Article apply with equal force to other consensual relationships, and we
view fiduciary relationships as fundamentally consensual. Cf id. at 1015 ("Ordinarily, given
that fiduciary power is authority derived from the legal capacity of another person, it must be
conferred by some manifestation of consent of the person from whose capacity it is
derived.").
5 The exercise of discretion is not the same merely as having a choice. See H.L.A.
Hart, Discretion, 127 HARv. L. REV. 652, 656 (2013) ("[I]t would be mistaken to identify the
notion of discretion with the notion of choice (tout court)."). But precisely defining the
nature of choices that constitute "discretion" is challenging. See id. at 658 ("It seems to me
then that discretion occupies an intermediate place between choices dictated by purely
personal or momentary whim and those which are made to give effect to clear methods of
reaching clear aims or to conform to rules whose application to the particular case is
obvious.").
6 The most commonly cited scholarly works in the canon of fiduciary law emphasize
the importance of discretion in fiduciary relationships. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J.
Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991) ("Ideally, for the beneficiary, this relationship would
be governed by specific rules that dictate how the fiduciary should manage the asset in the
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fiduciary relationships is not merely an artifact of human weakness, but a
crucial part of the fiduciary bargain. To borrow an expression from software
design, contractual incompleteness is not a bug, it's a feature.7
The law has two strategies for dealing with discretion in the fiduciary
context: disempowerment and fiduciary duty.8 Disempowerment is effective at
protecting the beneficiaries from opportunism, but disempowerment disables
the fiduciary from engaging in transactions that would be desirable for the
beneficiary.9 As a result, "modem law has come to substitute fiduciary
obligation for disempowerment as the preferred regulatory response."10
beneficiary's best interests. In fact, however, the fiduciary's obligations are open-ended.");
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 901 ("If the relationship, as the parties structure it, does not confer discretion on the
'fiduciary,' then his actions are not subject to the fiduciary constraint."); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & EcON. 425, 426
(1993) (describing fiduciary relationships as situations in which "one party hires the other's
knowledge and expertise"); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 813
(1983) ("[E]ven if [complete] contractual arrangements were feasible, the transaction costs
involved in drawing up a detailed prior agreement covering all possible discretionary uses of
power over the life of the relation would not only be enormous, but also would probably
exceed the benefits of the proposed relation."); Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 232 ("[F]iduciary duties are justified in particular situations where
other devices for controlling discretion are likely to be ineffective."); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary
Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69 (1962) (finding the origin of fiduciary law in
relationships where one person "reposed confidence" in another); D. Gordon Smith, The
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1403 (2002) ("What
distinguishes a fiduciary from many other contracting parties . .. is that a fiduciary exercises
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary, whereas most
contracting parties exercise discretion only with respect to their own performance under the
contract."); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 7 (1975)
("[T]he hallmark of a fiduciary relation is that the relative legal positions are such that one
party is at the mercy of the other's discretion.").
7 The notion that parties bargain for discretion is related to the idea of "deliberate
ambiguity" in contract drafting. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005) ("Deliberate ambiguity may be a
necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be unable to agree on certain
points yet be content to take their chances on being able to resolve them, with or without
judicial intervention, should the need arise. It is a form of compromise like 'agreeing to
disagree."'). Another related concept is "strategic incompleteness." See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 127 (1989) ("[W]hen one party to a contract knows more than another, the
knowledgeable party may strategically decide not to contract around even an inefficient
default. Because the process of contracting around a default can reveal information, the
knowledgeable party may purposefully withhold information to get a larger piece of the
smaller contractual pie.").
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Fiduciary duty is a "doctrine of last resort," meaning that it is "activated
only when all other potentially applicable commands from constitutions,
statutes, regulations, ordinances, common law decisions and contracts have
been exhausted."11 The space for decision-making that remains after taking
account of fiduciary duty is discretion, as illustrated by the figure below.
Figure 1: Discretion as a "Doctrine ofLast Resort"
The outside boundary of these concentric circles is intended to encompass
all actions that could occur in a state of nature. Some of those actions are
proscribed by positive law, and we call these proscriptions "regulatory
constraints." These regulatory constraints shrink the decision-making space.
Within the remaining decision-making space, parties engage in private ordering,
and the obligations imposed in that process are labeled "contractual
constraints." These include all of the express and implied obligations in
contracts, as well as obligations derived from the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
The contractual constraints further shrink the decision-making space, and
what remains is the space allocated for good-faith decision-making in the
11 D. Gordon Smith, Doctrines of Last Resort, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS
SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 426, 427 (Jean
Braucher et al. eds., 2013).
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contractual relationship. If that relationship is fiduciary in nature, the decision-
making space is further constrained by the duty of loyalty, which proscribes
"self-interested behavior that constitutes a wrong to the beneficiary as a result
of the fiduciary exercising discretion with respect to the beneficiary's critical
resources."12 The remaining space (the center circle) represents actions that are
possible after accounting for all legal and contractual constraints. This is a
fiduciary's discretion. As noted in the center circle (and suggested by the
shading), discretion can be influenced by various non-legal constraints,
including market forces, reputational concerns, industry customs, social norms,
and moral values.13
Some legal commentators have observed a distinction between standards of
conduct and standards of liability in fiduciary law.14 Standards of conduct,
12 Smith, supra note 6, at 1407 (emphasis omitted). The duty is often expressed more
succinctly as a duty to refrain from self-dealing. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing
Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REv. 899, 908 (2011) ("The fiduciary duty is properly
conceived as simply one to refrain from self-dealing."). We avoid this simpler construction
because it could imply a duty of complete unselfishness, which is an inaccurate description
of fiduciary obligation. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
Paul Miller claims that fiduciaries are subject to two conflict rules:
The conflict of interest rule prohibits the fiduciary from allowing personal interests
actually or potentially to conflict with the interests of the beneficiary. The conflict of
interest rule thus prohibits disloyal conduct grounded in the self-interest of the
fiduciary. The conflict of duty rule prohibits the fiduciary from acting under conflicting
mandates. In other words, it prohibits disloyal conduct grounded in conflicting duties to
two third parties, even if the fiduciary's self-interest is not in play. The conflict of duty
rule thus proscribes disloyal conduct rooted in inconsistent allegiances of the fiduciary.
Miller, supra note 4, at 977 (footnotes omitted). While conflicts of duty are unpleasant, they
are inevitable for some fiduciaries, and fiduciary law does not prohibit action in the face of
such conflicts. For example, a trustee must act impartially with regard to beneficiaries who
have conflicting interests. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(l)(a) (2007) ("[T]he
trustee must act impartially and with due regard for the diverse beneficial interests created
by the terms of the trust.").
13 The concentric circles offer only a rough representation of the relationship between
the varied constraints on behavior. We use the circles primarily to suggest the residual nature
of discretion in fiduciary relationships. One potentially interesting and unexplored (in this
Article) feature of the figure is that the annuli (i.e., the spaces between the concentric circles)
would be different sizes in different legal systems. One sees this, for example, in Legal
Origins Theory, which holds that "common law stands for the strategy of social control that
seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace such outcomes
with state-desired allocations." Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences ofLegal
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 286 (2008).
14 Credit goes to Mel Eisenberg for initially raising this distinction in corporate law.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 437 (1993). Gordon Smith criticized the use of
this distinction by drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act. See D. Gordon Smith, A
Proposal To Eliminate Director Standards from the Model Business Corporation Act, 67 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1201, 1202 (1999). For a recent treatment of these concepts, see Julian Valasco,
The Role ofAspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 519 (2012).
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which tell a fiduciary to act or deal fairly with regard to the beneficiary,15
motivate fiduciaries to move toward the core of the circle, the place least likely
to face resistance from legal or non-legal constraints. Meanwhile, standards of
liability define the boundary of the inner circle. Our primary task in this Article
is to explain how courts draw that boundary between the appropriate exercise of
discretion and breach of fiduciary duty.
By enforcing the boundaries of fiduciary discretion by reference to industry
customs and social norms, fiduciary law encourages contract formation. 16 As
observed by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, "legal rules can promote
the benefits of contractual endeavors in a world of scarce information and high
transactions costs."17 Gordon Smith and Darian Ibrahim recently argued that
"promoting entrepreneurial action is a fundamental value of the U.S. legal
system."18 In this Article, we find that value at the heart of fiduciary law. 19
In Part II we describe the inevitability of discretion in contractual
relationships, then briefly catalogue various legal and non-legal constraints on
that discretion. In Part III we argue that the duty of loyalty performs boundary
enforcement on fiduciary actions. We further argue that the content of the duty
of loyalty is derived from non-legal sources, particularly industry customs and
social norms. We conclude in Part IV by applying these concepts to the area of
competition in employment.
II. CONSTRAINTS ON DISCRETION
In examining constraints on discretion, we are concerned only with
situations of conflict. Where the interests of contracting parties are aligned, no
constraints are necessary. 20 Complete contracts would, theoretically, result in
15 Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 450.
16 See Smith. supra note 11, at 427.17 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 426.
18 D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2013).
19 Our claim that the content of the duty of loyalty is derived from industry customs and
social norms is consistent with the "centrality of custom to our torts system." Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REv. 285, 286 (2008).
Nevertheless, there is some tension between our claim that fiduciary law, thus conceived,
promotes entrepreneurial action, and the claim that "courts' reliance on customs and
conventional technologies as the benchmark for assigning tort liability chills innovation and
distorts its path." Id. We offer a more complete defense of the connection between fiduciary
law and innovation elsewhere, see D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Loyalty Across Time
(2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), but for present purposes it should
suffice to observe that tort law and fiduciary law influence different aspects of a relationship.
Thus, while tort law's reliance on custom and norms may discourage innovation in industrial
procedures, product development, or medical care, fiduciary law's reliance on custom and
norms encourages formation of relationships that lead to entrepreneurial action.
20 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976) ("[It is
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the perfect alignment of interests, but in a world of incomplete contracting, the
threat of liability often combines with self-interest, social norms, and trust to
embolden the parties to form a relationship and to align their interests in that
relationship.21 In this Part, we describe the inevitability of discretion in
contractual relationships, then briefly catalogue the legal and non-legal
constraints on discretion that embolden contract formation.
A. Inevitability ofDiscretion
Nobel Laureates Kenneth Arrow and G6rard Debreu imagined a world
without discretion in developing their general equilibrium theory.22 In that
world, markets are complete, and complete markets always clear, with every
seller finding a buyer at a negotiated price.23 Market participants operate in the
face of uncertainty, but they are able to order their affairs through complete
contingent claims contracts, which anticipate all states of the world and specify
the obligations of all parties in each of those states. 24 In this imaginary world,
post-contractual discretion does not exist because it is not necessary.
Markets are not complete in the sense described by Arrow and Debreu, of
course, because (among other reasons) contracting parties suffer from bounded
rationality, 25 a concept that includes an inability to negotiate future plans
because parties "have to find a common language to describe states of the world
and actions with respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a
guide."26 As a result, complete contingent claims contracts do not exist in the
generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will
make optimal decisions from the principal's viewpoint.").2 1 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLuM. L. REV.
1253, 1253 (1999) ("Insofar as corporate law is regulatory, it provides incentives and
disincentives to the major actors in the corporate enterprise . . . through the threat of liability.
In significant part, however, these actors are motivated not by the desire to avoid liability,
but by the prospect of financial gain, on the one hand, and by social norms, on the other.").
22 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-
Taking Situations, 19 ECONOMETRICA 404, 405 (1951); Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu,
Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265, 265
(1954). See generally Gerard Debreu, The Coefficient of Resource Utilization, 19
ECONOMETRICA 273 (1951).
23 The notion of "commodity" includes the place and time of the trade. See Arrow &
Debreu, supra note 22, at 266.
24 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles ofRelational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1089, 1090 (1981) (describing the complete contingent claim contract).
25 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECONOMICS
99, 104 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68
AM. EcoN. REv., May 1978, at 1, 10; Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in
Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. EcoN. REv. 253, 254-55 (1959).
2 6 0L[VER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRucTuRE 23 (1995). The
degree to which contracts are incomplete depends in part on the tradeoff between the
anticipated hazards of ex post opportunism and the costs of ex ante design. See Keith J.
2014] 615
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real world. Contracts are inevitably incomplete. 27 Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel make the point with more flair:
When the task is complex, when efforts will span a substantial time, when the
principal cannot measure (or evaluate) the agent's effort, when an assessment
of the outcome is not a good substitute for measuring effort (because the
outcome may be attributable to luck, or to a superior effort by some
competitor), and when a relative shortage of information hinders the drawing
of conclusions even when the outcome may be highly informative, a detailed
contract would be silly.28
When contracts are incomplete, one or more of the parties will possess
some discretion over performance, and this discretion introduces the possibility
of opportunism. 29 We can fruitfully divide this discretion into two types:
discretion over the performance of contract duties and discretion over the
performance of fiduciary duties.30 Each of these forms of discretion is assigned
its own legal doctrine to mitigate opportunism. 31 Incompleteness in the
specification of the performance of contract duties is governed by the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and incompleteness in the specification of
performance of fiduciary duties is governed by the duty of loyalty.32
Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical
Analysis ofAir Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECONOMICS 126, 127 (1993).27 BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 4, at 491. For a summary of legal and
economic conceptions of contracting, see D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts
as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-19 (2009).28 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 426.29 Oliver Williamson famously defined opportunism as "self-interest seeking with
guile." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTrruTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985); see
also Robert P. Bartlett, 1II, Commentary, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 47,
48-49 (2009) ("[I]n any cooperative relationship one party inevitably holds some amount of
discretionary and unobservable decision-making authority that can affect the welfare of the
other party.").
30 The difference between fiduciary relationships and arm's-length contractual
relationships has been the subject of much debate. See D. Gordon Smith, Contractually
Adopted Fiduciary Duty, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming). In this Article, we take the
identification of the relationship as a given.
31 Cf DeMott, supra note 6, at 892 (noting that both fiduciary duties and the duty of
good faith and fair dealing "operate to limit a party's permissible use of discretion or of a
power or advantage obtained over another person").
32 Cf Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-contractual
Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in THE PHLOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
(forthcoming 2014) (asserting that a "contract promisor ... must honor her contract but go




Generally speaking, courts award money damages for the breach of express
and implied-in-fact obligations in enforceable contracts.33 In addition, a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in law in (almost) every
contract. 34 This covenant is a judicial acknowledgement of the incompleteness
of contracts. 35 Even after accounting for all express and implied terms, judges
still find gaps in contracts. In many instances, contracting parties recognize the
inevitability or usefulness of discretion and either grant unfettered discretion to
one of the parties36 or grant discretion that is bounded by the express terms of
the contract. In this Section, we describe ways in which transactional lawyers
create and control discretionary authority. 37
Loan agreements are notorious for the breadth of discretion granted to
lenders. For example, loan agreements frequently give a lender broad discretion
to determine whether the performance of a borrower satisfies a requirement in
the agreement. 38 This discretion, combined with many detailed covenants,
places the borrower in a vulnerable position. As noted by Claire Hill, "If
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) provides, "A promise may be
stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."
When one of the parties breaches a promise and injures another party, the injured party has a
right to damages. Id. § 346.
34 See, e.g., id. § 205 ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."). A notable exception to this rule is
preferred stock in Delaware, the terms of which are strictly construed. See D. Gordon Smith,
Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital
Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 825, 841 (2004) (discussing an interpretive rule of strict
construction for preferred stock terms).
35 See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect
World: What To Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 WiS. L. REv. 323, 343-44 (linking incomplete contracts to the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealine).
36 See, e.g., Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 226 P.3d 1277, 1279
(Idaho 2010) (describing a contract governing the terms of teacher employment that gave the
principal discretion with regard to the granting of professional leaves); Dick Broad. Co. of
Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 657-58 (Tenn. 2013) (interpreting a contract
providing that assignment of a right of first refusal cannot be made "without the consent of
the [other party]"). Even if contracts are unambiguous in their grant of unfettered discretion,
courts are reluctant to enforce such provisions without imposing the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. See, e.g., Potlatch Educ. Ass'n, 226 P.3d at 1281 ("Even though the plain
text of the Master Agreement seems to impart unfettered discretion to the principal in
authorizing professional leave, this Court implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
into all contracts."); Dick Broad. Co., 395 S.W.3d at 669 ("To avoid the imposition of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the parties must explicitly state their
intention to do so.").
37 For a useful introduction to this topic, see.TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS:
HOW AND WHY LAWYERS Do WHAT THEY Do 142-45 (2007).
38Thomas J. Hall & Stacey Trimmer, Good Faith and Lenders' Exercise of
Contractual "Sole Discretion, " 126 BANKING L.J. 483, 483 (2012).
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contract words had their literal meaning, the lender's discretion would be
limitless: conventional wisdom is that at all times, every borrower under every
loan agreement is in 'technical' default."39
Lender discretion can be created through an aggressive grant of discretion,
such as a statement in the contract providing that some action is in the "sole
discretion" of the bank,40 or merely by using the word "may," as in "the Bank
may waive the Event of Default." 41 Regardless of the form of the grant of
discretion, courts incline toward limiting that discretion through the application
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.42
Gordon Smith has referred to the duty of good faith and fair dealing as a
"form of loyalty obligation," 43 but this implied duty inheres in most contractual
relationships, not only in fiduciary relationships.44 Moreover, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing is unlike a fiduciary duty because the former requires
fidelity to the deal, while the latter demands fidelity to the beneficiary of the
duty. 45
While the content of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is derived from
the contract, industry customs and social norms play an important role in
extrapolating from the express terms of the contract to the content of the duty.46
For example, in the well-known case of Market Street Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Frey,47 Judge Richard Posner measured the "sharp dealing" of a
contracting party against social norms in analyzing the duty of good faith and
fair dealing:
We do not usually excuse contracting parties from failing to read and
understand the contents of their contract; and in the end what this case comes
down to-or so at least it can be strongly argued-is that an immensely
39Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business
Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 50 (2001).
40 See, e.g., Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell, 661 So. 2d 1325, 1327 (La. 1995) (note
"gave the Bank the right in its sole discretion to extend the maturity date of the note").
41 See STARK, supra note 37, at 142.
42 See Hall & Trimmer, supra note 38, at 491-92 ("[T]he implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing frequently is called upon in a court's analysis of the propriety of a lender's
contractual regard of sole discretion.").
43 Smith, supra note 6, at 1409.
44 See, e.g., Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1995) ("Implicit
in all contracts is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of contract
performance.").
45 Smith, supra note 6, at 1410 ("[T]he fiduciary must refrain from self-interested
behavior that wrongs the beneficiary, whereas contracting parties may act in a self-interested
manner even where the other party is injured, as long as such actions are reasonably
contemplated by the contact.").
46 U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. 20 (2002) ("[T]he obligation of 'good faith,' applicable in each
Article, is to be interpreted as including both the subjective element of honesty in fact and
the objective element of the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing.").
47 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
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sophisticated enterprise simply failed to read the contract. On the other hand,
such enterprises make mistakes just like the rest of us, and deliberately to take
advantage of your contracting partner's mistake during the performance
stage . . . is a breach of good faith.4 8
Situations in which contracting parties place boundaries on their
counterparties are somewhat different from the "sole discretion" cases. While
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing would still place some limits on
discretion, most of the heavy lifting is done by the express terms of the contract.
The boundaries are often drawn by negative covenants, which are prominent in
venture capital contracts, 49 bond indentures, 50 merger agreements, 5 1 intellectual
property license agreements, 52 and other formal contracts. 53 The negative
4 81d. at 597 (emphasis added); see also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 574 (Ariz.
1986) (holding that testimony regarding industry customs was relevant to analysis of breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Reed v. State Farm, 857 So. 2d 1012,
1022 n.9 (La. 2003) (noting that the concept of good faith and fair dealing represents a
"moral and ethical obligation" legally imposed by the legislature); Brunswick Hills Racquet
Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 399 (N.J. 2005) (finding that
the duty enforces "ethical norms").
49 See Model Legal Documents, NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, http://www.nvca.org/
index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=136 (last visited Mar. 2013)
(including many "protective provisions" that cabin the discretion of the corporation with
regard to matters of importance to the venture capitalists). For a study of these covenants,
see Ola Bengtsson, Covenants in Venture Capital Contracts, 57 MGMT. SCL 1926 (2011).
50 See Comm. on Trust Indentures & Indenture Trs., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Model
Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions, 61 Bus. LAW. 1439, 1490 (2006) (describing
covenants that limit the actions of the issuer of bonds). For a study of these covenants, see
Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcON. 117 (1979).
51 1 AM. BAR Ass'N MERGERS & AcQuisITIONS COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONs,
MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2010); see also Afra
Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees,
63 VAND. L. REv. 1161, 1171-72 (2010) (describing a covenant that obligates the seller to
"operate its business only in the 'ordinary course' and 'consistent with past practice'
between signing the acquisition agreement and closing in order to ensure that no significant
or unusual transactions are undertaken without the buyer's knowledge and consent")
(footnote omitted); Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REv.
481, 499 (2009) (describing "material adverse change" clauses, which "is a provision in an
acquisition agreement that permits an acquirer to refuse to complete the transaction if a
material and adverse change, as defined in the acquisition agreement, occurs to an acquiree
prior to the time of completion of the acquisition").
52 See, e.g., Amy Slater, Software License Agreement, in 2 CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS:
BUS. TRANSACTIONS § 9:57 (2013) (explaining that software licensing agreements
commonly "place[] responsibility on the licensee to ensure that the software is not exported
in violation of. . . government restrictions").
53 Bobby Bartlett describes two challenges inherent in contracting: (1) "The very
concept of a contract as a legally enforceable promise presumes a situation where a
contracting party no longer finds it in her interest to honor a promise and must be forced to
do so (or at least pay for the resulting damage)"; and (2)
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covenants often permit actions by a contracting party, subject to limits specified
by the size or effects of the transactions.
When independent contractors act within the parameters defined by the
negative covenants, they are acting within the scope of their discretion. Subject
to an exceptional challenge under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, such parties are in compliance with the contract, even if their actions
are self-serving. The difference between independent contractors and fiduciaries
is that the latter are subject to the additional constraint of the duty of loyalty,
which regulates their self-interested actions, even when those actions are within
the scope of the discretion granted by the contract.
C. Fiduciary Constraints
Although incomplete contracts are inevitable, contracting parties routinely
create fiduciary relationships, in which one party (the beneficiary) seems
especially vulnerable to opportunism by the counterparty (the fiduciary). 54 The
source of a beneficiary's vulnerability is the fiduciary's discretion with respect
to some critical resource belonging to the beneficiary,55 and that discretion is
just as self-interest may encourage a party to break a promise in the first instance, it
may also compel a party to use what other discretion she has in a relationship to seek
individual advantage in less direct ways that can nonetheless adversely affect the
welfare of other parties in that relationship.
Bartlett, supra note 29, at 50. Bartlett then observes:
[A]s both a student and drafter of contracts, I am repeatedly surprised at how the
architecture of contracts across a variety of domains consistently maps onto these two
basic real-world challenges. Be it a bond indenture, an acquisition agreement, a supply
agreement, or even a home purchase agreement, I expect a short provision (usually
early in the agreement) outlining the basic bargain ("The undersigned Lenders promise
to loan . . . ."; "I promise to sell .... ; "Buyer promises to purchase . . . .") followed by
a cascade of ancillary promises, representations, and express conditions that seek to
cabin the ability of a party to use its residual discretion in a manner that might impair
this bargain ("Seller represents that it has full right and title in all Trademarks listed on
Appendix A .... ; "Target agrees that Buyer may terminate this Agreement if any
representations are materially inaccurate as of the Closing Date"; "Seller represents that
the premises are free of all rodents.").
Id. at 50-51.
54 Commentary on fiduciary law often emphasizes the vulnerability of beneficiaries.
See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REv. 441, 470 (2010) ("[A]ll beneficiaries are vulnerable to
the fiduciary's abuse of legally entrusted administrative power over their legal and practical
interests."); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEENS
L.J. 259, 275 (2005) (asserting that a fiduciary obligation arises "whenever one party
unilaterally assumes discretionary power of an administrative nature over the important
interests of another, interests that are especially vulnerable to the fiduciarv's discretion").
55 See Smith, supra note 6, at 1404 ("[T]he beneficiary's vulnerability emanates from
an inability to protect against opportunism by the fiduciary with respect to the critical
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often identified as an essential characteristic of fiduciary relationships.56 The
fiduciary duty of loyalty constrains that discretion by proscribing certain forms
of self-interested behavior by fiduciaries. In Part III, we argue that the central
role of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is boundary enforcement, and the content of
this duty is derived from industry customs and social norms. For present
purposes, however, it is enough to know simply that the fiduciary duty of
loyalty constrains discretion.
The fiduciary duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to "refrain from self-
interested behavior that constitutes a wrong to the beneficiary as a result of the
fiduciary exercising discretion with respect to the beneficiary's critical
resources." 57 This other-regarding duty is common to all fiduciary
relationships,58 but courts tailor the duty to specific contexts.
Commentators disagree about the breadth of application of fiduciary
obligation, with some arguing for application of the duty of loyalty in a wide
variety of contexts, 59 while others would limit the duty to a much smaller
number of relationships.60 Commentators also disagree about the duties that
resource [and] fiduciary law can be justified on the grounds that it deters opportunistic
behavior."). Smith does not attempt to define "critical resource" with precision, instead
noting:
Whether the existence of a particular thing justifies the imposition of fiduciary
duties ... depends on whether that thing provides the fiduciary with the occasion to act
opportunistically. And whether that thing provides the fiduciary with the occasion to act
opportunistically will depend in large part on whether society has made a normative
decision that the thing belongs to the beneficiary. This decision is exogenous to the
critical resource theory.
Id. at 1444. Smith's critical resource theory has been used in a variety of settings to evaluate
relationships, but Paul Miller has argued that the theory suffers from indeterminacy. Miller,
supra note 4, at 1001. Miller has proposed instead that fiduciary relationships form when
"one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interests
of another (the beneficiary)." Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 McGILL
L.J. 235, 262 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
56 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 55, at 273 ("[T]he fiduciary must have scope for
judgment in the exercise of power."); Weinrib, supra note 6, at 4 ("Two elements thus form
the core of the fiduciary concept and these elements can also serve to delineate its frontiers.
First, the fiduciary must have scope for the exercise of discretion, and, second, this
discretion must be capable of affecting the legal position of the principal.").57 Smith. suora note 6. at 1407.
58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b ("Despite the differences in the
legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one characteristic is common
to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of
the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship.").
59 See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDuCIARY LAW 42-62 (2011) (applying fiduciary law to
trustees, corporate directors, physicians, lawyers, brokers and dealers. soouses. and friends).60 See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 12, at 900 ("I maintain that fiduciary duties should be
fenced into a limited area rather than allowed to roam freely on the range of human
relationships."); Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law's "Holy Grail": Reconciling Theory
and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REv. 921, 935 (2011) ("[F]iduciary law
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properly fall within the ambit of "fiduciary duty." For example, many
commentators do not view the duty of care as a fiduciary duty,61 even though it
is typically treated as a fiduciary duty by courts. 62
Some commentators view fiduciary duties as a species of implied contract
terms,63 but we believe that view is, at best, imprecise, and, at worst, seriously
misleading with regard to the role of judges. 64 One problem is that viewing
fiduciary duties as contract terms implies that judges should craft particular
rules for the parties. 65 Often framed in terms of a hypothetical bargain,66 this
approach urges judges to choose the result the parties would have chosen had
they anticipated the situation at issue, but this sort of reasoning is quite different
from deciding simply whether the fiduciary acted appropriately within the scope
of her discretion.
D. Non-legal Constraints
Non-legal forces also act as boundaries on discretion, even where legal
constraints are absent. Sociologists, economists, psychologists, philosophers,
was never intended to apply to the garden variety of cases. Fiduciary law supplements the
laws of contract, tort, and unjust enrichment by filling in their gaps where they are either
silent or deficient and enforcing both the spirit and intent of law, not merely its letter.").
6 1 See, e.g., William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary Duty of Care: A Perversion of Words,
38 AKRON L. REv. 181, 206 (2005) ("The muddled state of the law of fiduciary breach can
be improved if the courts realize that negligence and intent are quite different concepts.");
see also DeMott, supra note 6, at 915 (asserting that the duty of care "is not distinctively
fiduciary").
6 2 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) overruled by
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (describing a director's "duty to exercise an
informed business judgment" as a fiduciary duty).
63 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 427 ("The duty of loyalty replaces
detailed contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by prescribing the actions
the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap and all promises fully
enforced."); Ribstein, supra note 12, at 900 ("[T]he fiduciary duty is most usefully viewed
as a type of contract.").
64 See Markovits, supra note 32 ("[F]iduciary relations and the obligations that they
involve cannot inhabit a contractual form.").
65 Cf Miller, supra note 4, at 983:
In contract it is assumed that the parties will act in a mutually self-interested manner.
Each is responsible for securing their interests in dealings with the other. In fiduciary
law, by contrast, it is assumed that the parties are interacting for the exclusive benefit of
one of them-the beneficiary. The fiduciary is responsible for the beneficiary. The
beneficiary is entitled to the fiduciary's loyalty. There is no mutuality, for the
beneficiary has no duty to the fiduciary by virtue of the fiduciary relationship as such.
6 6 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 431 ("A court setting out to protect principals
from their agents must use the hypothetical contract approach; the only alternative is to
injure the persons the rule makers want to help."). Easterbrook and Fischel refer to
approaches other than the contractual view which produces the hypothetical bargain as
"noneconomic approaches." Id. at 432.
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anthropologists, and others have been studying norms and their influence on
human behavior for decades. 67 In recent years, legal scholars have incorporated
the study of norms into the legal literature,68 which attempts to use social norms
to explain human behavior and predict the effect of legal rules. 69
The terms and definitions legal scholars use to identify the social forces that
influence behavior are many and varied. 70 At a basic level, norms are social
"rules and standards that define the limits of acceptable behavior."71 In this
Article, we speak of norms in a general sense, 72 referring to social customS73
and rules 74 that constrain individual behavior within a society.75
67 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 145-50 (1984);
GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 225-30 (1996); JAMES S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 245-92 (1990); RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE
LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 140-41 (1995); TALCOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 16
(1912); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 167-73 (1982);
EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 8-10 (1977); MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 27 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958); Judith
Blake & Kingsley Davis, Norms, Values, and Sanctions, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN
SOCIOLOGY 456, 456-82 (Robert E.L. Faris ed., 1964); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of
Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. Soc. REV. 161, 177-78 (1960).
68 Robert Ellickson is often credited as the first legal scholar to address norms in the
context of law in his book ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 184-
240 (1991), but other legal scholars were also considering the interaction between norms and
law around the same time period. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 63 (1963); Warren F. Schwartz et al.,
The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 321-22
(1984). For well-known contributions to the legal literature, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766
(1996); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585 (1998);
William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 545; Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation ofNorms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355
(1997); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697,
1698 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms]; Richard A.
Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365
(1997); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 765, 797 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms];
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996).69 McAdams, supra note 68, at 340.70 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1255 ("An analysis of the operation of social norms in
the law presents severe problems of terminology."); McAdams, supra note 68, at 342
("[T]here is as yet no consensus about .. . the meaning of norm."); Posner, Symbols, Signals,
and Social Norms, supra note 68, at 797 (noting that the term "social norm" is used to refer
to "many different kinds of behavior").
71 Jones, supra note 68, at 545.72 See Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, supra note 68, at 1699 (noting
that arbitrary definitions are a defect of all writings on norms).
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Norms are most influential when they are both obligational 76 and
internalized.77 Robert Cooter described internalization as the "acceptance of a
new reason for acting."78 He noted that the effects of internalization on behavior
are twofold: "First, people who have internalized a norm would obey it even
when doing so does not serve their narrow self-interest," and "[s]econd, people
who feel that a norm should be obeyed tend to criticize or punish others who
violate the norm." 79 Thus, internalization influences internal (or self)
enforcement and external (or social) enforcement of social norms.
Cooter also discussed the situations in which individuals are most likely to
internalize social norms.80 He determined that "[a] rational person internalizes a
norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original
preferences and the changed preferences." 81 He predicted that such
internalization would also perpetuate norms and norm adherence in situations in
which "unanimous endorsement" of a certain behavior "will convince some
73 See Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1, 2 n.2 (1999) ("While the concepts 'norm' and 'custom' may be usefully
distinguished in some contexts, in tort law they are best treated as synonymous.").
74 See Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, supra note 68, at 1699 ("A
norm can be understood as a rule that distinguishes desirable and undesirable behavior
[that] . . . constrains attempts by people to satisfy their preferences.").
75 We also acknowledge that an in-depth study of norms might warrant a more
particularized definition of norms and customs. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1261
(distinguishing between "obligational" and "nonobligational" norms in the corporate
context); see also David Charny, Illusions ofa Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual
Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841, 1845 (1996) (noting that it might not be helpful to
use the same term, "norms," to refer to both "comprehensive and relatively complex
regimes" with a central governing agency and decentralized "informal and diffuse
sanctioning systems").
76 See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1257 (referring to obligational norms as those norms
that are self-consciously adhered to and carry with them a sense of obligation, either because
of self-criticism or criticism by others).
77 Id; see Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1665
(1996) ("[A] social norm is ineffective in a community and does not exist unless people
internalize it."); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735, 1739-40 (2001)
(positing that a trusted actor will sometimes behave "trustworthily" because of an
"internalized" desire); Lessig, supra note 68, at 997 ("[S]ocial meanings can and often do
function as selective incentives . . . because (1) social meanings construct a . .. semiotic
content ... and because (2) individuals internalize these norms and feel this semiotic
content."). But see McAdams, supra note 68, at 381 (arguing that a person may feel
obligated to comply with norms either for "esteem reasons [that he seeks the esteem of
others], or because the obligation is internalized, or both").
78 Cooter, supra note 77, at 1662.
79 1d at 1695.80 Cooter, supra note 68.
81 Id. at 586. Cooter labels this commitment a "Pareto self-improvement." Id.
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members of the community to internalize the obligation, and to inculcate it in
the young." 82
Norms often carry moral implications, 83 but not necessarily. 84 Some norms
are simply so engrained in the society with which the actor associates that he
feels obligated, despite a lack of moral impetus, to engage in or not engage in a
particular behavior.85 Many actors do not experience norms as just another
consideration in their cost-benefit analysis. Rather, they subconsciously behave
in compliance with norms because the action is simply something that people
do or don't do.86
Insofar as an actor makes a conscious choice to comply or not comply with
social norms, norms are enforced through a variety of mechanisms.87 People
often adhere to social norms either because of self-criticism or criticism by
others.88 When a person has the discretion to act self-interestedly, if his action
would be in opposition to social norms, the actor is less likely to behave self-
interestedly. Sometimes legal rules facilitate or impede the enforcement of
social norms. 89 Other times norms are enforced through social mechanisms,
82 Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L. REv. L. & EcoN. 215, 224 (1994). Cooter's work speculates
about when a rational person internalizes a norm, but the more important issue for
policymakers is when people in fact internalize norms. For a nuanced discussion of this issue
in the corporate context, see Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate
Law, 43 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 457, 515-22 (2009).
8 3 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1259 ("[F]or many or most actors in many or most
situations internalized moral norms operate without a cost-benefit calculation ....84 Id
85Id. (noting that for actors who have internalized moral norms, "certain things (like
picking pockets) are simply not done, while other things (like assisting the unsighted across
the street) simelv are done").
86 Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity ofPrivate Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 215,
216 (2011) ("[C]itizens sometimes do what legal rules stipulate simply because they are
legal rules and not because of the incentives that the law offers for compliance.").
87 See Lessig, supra note 68, at 956 (noting that social meanings are instrumental: "One
uses an insult to oppress; one uses a 'thank you' to endear. One selects certain words over
other acts; in some contexts, one chooses a certain language to signal one meaning rather
than another."); see also, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 77, at 1748 (arguing that fear of
retaliation, reputational loss, and social sanctions are all market sanctions that act as
enforcement mechanisms of social norms); Charny, supra note 75, at 1841 (providing
examples of "non-legal" enforcement mechanisms, including expulsion from a trade
association or revocation of a license to use a trade emblem); Cooter, supra note 77, at 1668
(explaining that individuals who have internalized social norms are willing to enforce social
norms for the benefit of others through "[i]nformal sanctions like gossip and ostracism");
David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811, 1820 (2001) ("A
norm cannot survive unless it is enforced and, loosely speaking, norms are enforced in one
or more of three different ways: guilt, shunning, and shaming.").
88Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1257.89 See McAdams, supra note 68, at 346; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2025 (1996).
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independent of legal sanctions. 90 Informal social restraints include reputational
sanctions, loss of esteem, and shaming. Social norms may also be complied
with as a result of self-constraints, such as guilt or moral obligation.
Legal enforcement of social norms, either explicitly or implicitly, is
common in the American legal system. Sometimes legal constraints may
directly regulate compliance with social norms by incorporating norms into the
law.91 Law may also encourage compliance with particular social norms
through its expressive function92 or impede the formation and promulgation of
social norms by "crowding out" informal social norms.93
Law most directly enforces social norms when it incorporates norms, either
explicitly or implicitly, into a regulatory scheme. Some laws achieve an
enforcement function by making explicit reference to social norms in the text of
the regulation itself. One interesting example of this is the Uniform Commercial
Code sections, 94 drafted primarily by Karl Llewellyn, that explicitly require
decision-making with reference to social norms.95 Lisa Bernstein observed that,
although the Code requires courts to look first to the "express terms of the
agreement," then to the course of performance, course of dealing, usage of
trade, and finally to "the Code's own gap-fillers," in practice, social norms often
play a much more central role in judicial decision-making. 96
90 See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
92 See infra note 101.
93 See infra note 107.
94 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1991) ("Underlying purposes and policies of this Act
are .. . to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties."); id. § 1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions
of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant ... shall supplement
its provisions."); id. § 2-314(3) ("[I]mplied warranties may arise from course of dealing or
usage of trade."); id. § 2-504(b) (requiring a seller to provide those shipping documents
required by usage of trade); id. § 2-609(2) ("Between merchants the reasonableness of
grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined
according to commercial standards.").
9 5 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 68, at 1766; see also Charny, supra note 75.
9 6 See Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 7 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding
that, despite express price and quantity terms and a standard integration clause, evidence to
show that it was a custom and usage of the fertilizer industry that "express price and quantity
terms in contracts for materials in the mixed fertilizer industry are mere projections to be
adjusted according to market forces" was admissible to establish a consistent additional term
to the parties' written contract); Am. Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353
N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that judges, in "extend[ing]
themselves to reconcile trade usage and course of dealing with seemingly contradictory
express terms ... have permitted course of dealing and usage of trade to add terms, cut down
or subtract terms or lend special meaning to contract language"); Modine Mfg. Co. v. N.E.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837-38 (Tex. App. 1973) (holding that although the
contract provided that air-conditioning cooling "capacities shall not be less than indicated,"
it was nevertheless reversible error to exclude evidence that in the air-conditioning industry
it was customary for "reasonable variations in cooling capacity [to be] considered to comply
with the specifications"); Bernstein, supra note 68, at 1782-84 (citing, e.g., Nanakuli Paving
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Sometimes the incorporation of norms is more subtle through the use of
rules or standards that implicitly refer to social norms. Examples of implicit
incorporation of norms are the use of standards such as "reasonable
expectations," 97 "negligence," 98 "reasonableness," 99 or "ordinary care"100 in a
variety of legal contexts. Although these terms have abstract legal definitions,
they cannot be understood and applied without reference to social norms.
Law may also facilitate compliance with social norms by expressing the
desirability or undesirability of engaging in a particular behavior, without
actually imposing corresponding legal liability. Law often serves the function of
expressing, or creating, social norms, and these norms, in turn, influence the
behavior of the governed. 01 Law's "statement" about the impropriety of certain
actions "may be designed to affect social norms and in that way ultimately to
affect both judgments and behavior." 102 In other words, law matters not only
because of what it does but also because of what it says to and about those
& Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a Hawaiian
custom regarding "price protection" governed rather than an explicit contract provision)).
97 William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (2001) (positing that the reasonable expectations test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring),
requires courts to examine social norms of privacy to determine whether property is private
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
98 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing,
the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REv. 813, 834 (2001)
("Obviously, insofar as the negligence standard is not fully defined or specified, the law
cannot simply be applied. By establishing popular valuations as controlling for purposes of
the risk-utility test, however, the Restatement can be seen as giving those informal social
norms the force of law.").
9 9 See, e.g., Daniel Gilman, OfFruitcakes and Patriot Games, 90 GEO. L.J. 2387, 2387
(2002) ("Myriad norms, mores, customs, and customary understandings play a complex role
in the law, from informing the 'reasonable man' and 'reasonable person' standards in tort
law (and elsewhere), to filling in the normal and customary practices that vary across trades
in commercial law."); see also Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A
Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 765, 786 (1987)
(noting that norms "constitute the essence of tort law, which seeks to capture such norms
with formulas that often amount to little more than open-ended, incorporative allusions to
whatever pertinent social norms may exist. Thus, when people act in ways that affect others,
tort law requires them to use the care expected of 'the reasonable person."').
100 See, e.g., Hetcher, supra note 73, at 4 ("Ordinary behavior is customary behavior.
Courts look to whether an injurious action conformed to an accepted custom or social norm
in determining whether the action was ... negligent .... ).
101 Lawrence Lessig recognized these expressive effects of law in his analysis of the
construction of social meanings. See Lessig, supra note 68, at 951. He described social
meanings as "the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses,
within a particular context." Id Lessig posited that these social meanings are constructed
and that they can be constructed by government actors. Id at 949-50. He asserted that
changes in law could, or have, changed the popularity or desirability of a wide range of
social behavior. Id. at 1013.
102 Sunstein, supra note 89, at 2025.
2014] 627
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
subject to it.103 Thus, lawmakers create law not only for the causal results they
expect as a result of legal sanctions, but also to "make more and perhaps richer
statements about themselves, their institutions and the larger social setting in
which law and legal messages are generated and transmitted." 04 One popular
example of this is the development of law regarding race discrimination. Much
of the debate over school segregation, for example, was also a debate about the
meaning of laws calling for segregation. 105
Law also has the potential to inadvertently encourage non-compliance with
socially useful norms, or even to quash them all together.106 This occurrence,
referred to as "crowding out," has been discussed extensively in recent years.
Many scholars have argued that regulation can have adverse effects on the
formation and enforcement of social norms.107 Thus, although law may act as
an enforcement mechanism to constrain behavior to comply with socially useful
norms, it may also have the opposite effect.
Even where legal enforcement mechanisms are not in place, norms may still
be enforced through informal social mechanisms, such as reputation, esteem, or
shaming. A person is more likely to adhere to norms when he believes that
acquiring a reputation for doing so will further his own interests.108 Relatedly,
esteem may also act to enforce adherence to social norms. Richard McAdams
explained that people can "costlessly punish norm violators by withholding
from them the esteem they seek."109 Shaming also acts to enforce social
norms."l0 Shaming may be used by courts as a legal enforcement mechanism,
103 Id. at 2022.
104 Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive Function of Directors' Duties to Creditors, 12
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 224, 262-63 (2007).
105 Sunstein, supra note 89, at 2022 (explaining that Plessy v. Ferguson asserted that
laws calling for segregation did not "mean" black inferiority and that Brown v. Board of
Education further attempted to support this assertion via empirical work to the contrary).
106See Blair & Stout, supra note 77, at 1739 (discussing the negative impact of
regulation on trustworthiness).
107 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 68, at 1769 (discussing the negative effects on social
norms as a result of the search for "immanent business norms" advocated in the UCC);
Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunningham & Dorothy Thornton, Explaining Corporate
Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 51, 52
(2003) (arguing that regulation of corporate environmental performance may discourage
beyond-compliance behavior); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of
Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 136 (1996)
(discussing the effect of regulation on the effectiveness of group social enforcement
mechanisms).
108 Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms,
149 U. PA. L. REv. 1717, 1722 (2001) (noting that "a superior may tell the truth, reciprocate,
and act like a trustworthy person, not authentically, because he has internalized firm-specific
fairness norms, but instrumentally, to obtain the reputation that he needs to induce
supracontractual performance from subordinates").
109 McAdams, supra note 68, at 355.
I 0 Skeel, supra note 87, at 1821 ("[S]haming sanctions, like shaming generally, are a
device for enforcing norms.").
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but informal shaming may also act as an enforcement mechanism of social
norms.Ill
Norms may also be enforced by internal enforcement mechanisms,1 2 such
as guilt,113 pride,"l 4 or moral obligation. Guilt is the "psychological discomfort
a violation causes one who has internalized the norm, regardless of whether
others think she has violated the norm."115 Guilt often acts as a selective
incentive to induce individuals to comply with social norms because "(1) social
meanings construct a certain semiotic content to an individual act that make it
possible for them to be 'cheating' or 'disloyal' and because (2) individuals
internalize these norms and feel this semiotic content."' 1 6 Essentially, guilt
creates an emotional or psychological compulsion to obey norms.117 Guilt may
act as a sub-conscious compulsion to comply with -norms or it may be a
conscious part of a party's cost-benefit analysis." 8
Furthermore, norms may also be internally enforced as they become a part
of an actor's moral character, encouraging compliance through the party's
moral compass.119 As an actor internalizes the content of social norms, his
preferences change and his preferences then act to constrain him to comply with
S11 See generally id.
112 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. Cm. L. REV. 1197, 1211 (1997) ("[W]e need to
recognize sympathy and commitment as independent sources of motivation . .. economic
theories could not have predicted that anyone would risk life, family, comfort, and reputation
to rescue Jews during the Holocaust. And yet a significant number of people did." (citations
omitted)).
1l3 Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1724 ("Just as violating a social standard
provokes criticism from others, so violating an internalized standard provokes self-criticism
and uilt.").
14 See Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1059, 1089 (2003) (noting that "[p]ride from not breaching a duty of loyalty clearly is a
positive utility or a benefit in assessing social welfare").
115 McAdams, supra note 68, at 380.
116 Lessig, supra note 68, at 997.
17 See Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, supra note 68, at 1709 ("We say
about most norms that people bound by them feel an emotional or psychological compulsion
to obey the norms; norms have moral force. The compulsion might be slight or it might be
overwhelming; it does not prevent people from violating a norm, necessarily, but violation
does evoke feelings of shame or guilt." (citation omitted)). Posner further noted that the
observation that moral compulsion is a motivating factor in human behavior was made by
the philosopher David Hume. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 285-94 (L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., 3d ed. 1975) (1777).
ll 8 See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1259-60 ("In deciding whether to adhere to an
internalized moral norm, an actor may weigh the pain of guilt, the pleasure of rectitude, and
the external costs and benefits of adherence and nonadherence.").
119 See Cooter, supra note 68, at 586 ("Internalizing a social norm is a moral
commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act.").
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the internalized moral norm. 120 Thus, one's morality can also act as a powerful
force to induce compliance with social norms.
E. Trust
Many scholars discuss trust in much the same way they discuss social
norms.121 They often reference the same types of internal and societal
enforcement mechanisms.1 22 Insofar as trust is calculative, 123 or operates as any
other social norm would, it can be analyzed in much the same way as the other
social norms discussed above.124
However, where trust is not enforced by market sanctions as a social norm
would be, it operates as a residual category, encouraging a trustor to expose
himself to unconstrained discretion. When used in this sense, trust is the
concept underlying the fulfillment of promises and expectations in contractual
relationships. At its most basic level, trust is simply "believing that others tell
the truth and will keep their promises."1 25 Relationships of trust are often
characterized by a vulnerability to the risk of disappointment.126 Trust as we
120 See id. at 589 ("Internalization puts morality into preferences, not external
constraints.").
121 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 557 (2001)
(describing "principled trust" and explaining it much in the same terms as any other social
constraint, as trust "where the trustor is technically free to breach but 'opportunistic behavior
would violate values, principles, and standards of behavior that have been internalized by
parties to an exchange"').
122See, e.g., Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of
Competitive Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175, 175 (1994) (describing "weak form"
and "semi-strong form" trust as types of trust that rely on external enforcement
mechanisms-that the parties have voluntarily taken on constraints that ensure
performance). See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 77.
123 Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &
EcoN. 453, 476-86 (1993). Williamson, in his influential article defining "calculative" trust,
argued that most of what we call trust is actually strategic behavior driven by the fear of
retaliation or loss of reputation. Id. at 474. Although Williamson did not entirely dismiss the
idea of noncalculative trust, he suggested that it is "irrelevant to commercial exchange." Id.
at 469. He noted that the term "calculative trust" is actually a contradiction and argued that it
is misleading and confusing to use the word "trust" in connection with commercial
relationships. Id. at 463. Many scholars have similarly noted that "trust" formed as a result
of fear of retaliation, reputational loss or social sanctions is not really trust at all, but rather a
market constraint on behavior. See eenerallv Blair & Stout. supra note 77.
124 See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 40 (2008) (norms are necessary to generate trust in public corporations
"because of the vague, almost wholly unspecified nature of the relationship between
shareholders and the companies in which they invest").
12 5 TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A
CROSSROAD 49 (2006).
126 Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1717, 1724 (2006) (positing that trust is "a state of mind that enables its possessor to be
willing to make herself vulnerable to another-that is, to rely on another despite a positive
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discuss it here is free from external incentives, a "willingness to make oneself
vulnerable to another, based on the belief that the trusted person will choose not
to exploit one's vulnerability." 127 This type of trust has been characterized as
"an optimistic view of others"-the "confident expectation that, when the need
arises, the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that
you are counting on her." 28
Trust allows a contracting party to expose herself to at least some
unconstrained discretion. After the terms of the contract, fiduciary duties, and
social norms have all played their boundary enforcement roles, any remaining
discretion is left to trust. A contracting party will be more likely to engage in
relationships where more residual discretion exists if she believes that the other
party to the contract is trustworthy.129 Such a trust exchange increases
efficiencyl 30 and emboldens parties to enter into contractual relationships even
where some discretion is left unconstrained. 131
III. BOUNDARY ENFORCEMENT
In Part II we described a system of constraints on discretion. In this Part, we
use our focus on discretion as the foundation for two conceptual contributions
to the understanding of fiduciary law. First, reasoning from the observation that
fiduciary relationships are consensual, we contend that the grant of discretion in
fiduciary relationships is not merely an artifact of bounded rationality, but a
crucial part of the bargain.132 Second, we answer the question, how should a
court define the boundaries of fiduciary discretion. We observe that courts often
define these boundaries by reference to industry customs and social norms. We
risk that the other will act in a way that can harm the truster"); see also Barney & Hansen,
supra note 122, at 176 (using vulnerability to the risk of disappointment as a key feature to
distinguish between "weak form," "semi-strong form," and "strong form" trust).
127 See Blair & Stout, supra note 77, at 1739-40.
128 Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1464-65 (2005) (describing the
concept of "affective trust").
129 From a rational choice or economic perspective, trustworthiness is simply "the
likelihood that the person relied on will honor his promise." See Ribstein, supra note 121, at
556 (citation omitted). It has also been described as "an unwillingness to exploit a trusting
person's vulnerability even when external rewards favor doing so." See Blair & Stout, supra
note 77, at 1740.
130 See Blair & Stout, supra note 77, at 1757 ("Trust permits transactions to go forward
on the basis of a handshake rather than a complex formal contract.").
131 See id. ("Trust behavior also reduces losses from others' undetectable or
unpunishable opportunistic behavior, losses that could discourage the formation of valuable
agency and team production relationships in the first place."); see also Lawrence E.
Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DuKE L.J. 425, 425 (1993) ("[T]rust is
essential for corporate survival.").
132 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 426 (noting that fiduciary duties "reflect
both the nature of the principal's choice (he is hiring expertise) and an obvious condition
(the principal is unwilling to put himself at the mercy of an agent whose effort and
achievements are both exceedingly hard to monitor)").
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defend this as the most sensible and coherent approach to boundary
enforcement.
An important implication of these insights is that courts applying fiduciary
law should respect the grant of discretion to the fiduciary, rather than attempting
to displace that discretion with judicial mandate.133 Thus, we describe the role
of fiduciary law as boundary enforcement, 134 and we urge courts to honor
fiduciary actions that represent an appropriate exercise of discretion, even when
the beneficiary or the judge might perceive a preferable action after the fact.
The challenge for courts is to define the limits of fiduciary discretion in the
absence of express guidance from the beneficiary.135
If the role of fiduciary law is to enforce the boundaries of fiduciary
discretion, the question naturally arises, how should a court define those
boundaries? Commentators generally begin the examination of the duty of
loyalty with an abstract standard, such as the one articulated by then-Chief
Judge Cardozo in his justly famous opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in
a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
Salmon had put himself in a position in which thought of self was to be
renounced, however hard the abnegation. 136
Inspired by the language of Meinhard, many courts and commentators have
concluded that the fiduciary standard is "unselfishness" or "selflessness."1 37
133 This principle is sometimes acknowledged by leading authorities. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. b ("[J]udicial intervention is not warranted
merely because the court would have differently exercised the discretion."); cf Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83, 90
(2004) (arguing that under the business judgment rule, a "court .. . abstains from reviewing
the substantive merits of the directors' conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business
judgment rule's presumption of good faith").
134 Cf Miller, supra note 55, at 275 ("[T]he scope of rightful conduct is at once open
and bounded. Fiduciaries have discretion within the limits of authority reposed in them or
undertaken by them.").
135 If the beneficiary provides express boundaries in the contract, the court should
enforce those boundaries. See Smith, supra note 6, at 1492 ("[Iln most fiduciary settings,
parties may modify default rules of fiduciary duty through contract.").
136 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546-48 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted).
137 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 767, 776 (2000) (stating that the duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to
"completely subordinate self-interest and act exclusively for the benefit of the other party");
Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
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This is understandable, given Cardozo's assertion that "thought of self was to be
renounced, however hard the abnegation."l 38 Although superficially appealing,
this abstract standard cannot be understood literally because many fiduciaries
are motivated simultaneously by self-interest and a desire to serve their
beneficiaries.139 Thus, interpreting the standard of "unselfishness" requires
some contextualization.
Despite proclaiming that a "trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place,"' 40 Cardozo examined industry customs to evaluate
Salmon's behavior.141 For example, Cardozo inquired about Meinhard's
reasonable expectations of notice of termination in light of local practices' 42
and suggested that Salmon's duty of candor might be quite different if the new
lease related to "a building at a location far removed."1 43 Cardozo observed,
"For this problem, as for most, there are distinctions of degree."l44 These
distinctions of degree are informed by the judge's sense of variations in industry
customs or social norms in different situations.
Courts and commentators follow this same pattern of contextualization
regardless of the abstract standard. Of course, the most commonly employed
abstract standard is simply "loyalty," which is often defined as a duty to act for
the "sole benefit" of the beneficiary.145 As noted above, however, many
fiduciaries are motivated simultaneously by self-interest and a desire to serve
their beneficiaries, so "sole benefit" cannot mean sole benefit.
Moreover, in many fiduciary relationships, "sole benefit" or "undivided
loyalty" does not even mean that a fiduciary is required to preference the
beneficiary's interests over the fiduciary's own interests in all matters. For
example, the law of agency requires an agent to "refrain from competing with
the principal," 46 but acknowledges that the agent "who plans to compete is free
to make extramural arrangements for setting up a new business, such as
incorporating a new firm and arranging for space and equipment." 47 Similarly,
REv. 537, 542 (1997) ("As Justice Cardozo's statement makes clear, fiduciaries owe a duty
of unselfishness.").
138 Meinhard. 164 N.E. at 548.
139 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006) (noting that "an agent's
interests are often concurrent with those of the principal").
140 Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
141 The disjunction between Cardozo's aspirational language ("standard of conduct")
and the less demanding application ("standard of liability") is a widely recognized feature of
fiduciary law. See Smith, supra note 14, at 1208-09; see also Eisenberg, supra note 14, at
467-68; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1012, 1106 (1997).
142 Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547.
143Id. at 548.
144 Id
145 FRANKEL, supra note 59, at 108; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78
(2007) (requiring the trustee to act "solely in the interest of the beneficiaries").
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 (2006).
147 1d. § 8.04 cmt. c.
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law firm partners are notorious for "grabbing and leaving," leading one
commentator to observe, "fiduciary duties have not restricted the placement of
individual interest above the interest of the group to any meaningful degree." 48
Perhaps hoping to enhance the precision of the standard, courts and
standard-setting bodies often unbundle the duty of loyalty into various
subsidiary duties, such as the duty to account for profits,149 the duty to refrain
from dealing as or on behalf of an adverse party, 150 the duty to refrain from
competition with the beneficiary,' 5' and the duty to keep confidences.152 Of
course, even these more particular statements of the duty of loyalty do not
eliminate the fiduciary's discretion, nor do they provide well-defined limits on
that discretion. As we demonstrate in Part IV below in the context of
employment competition, judges often appeal to industry customs and social
norms in discerning the line between compliance and breach.
Peter Birks argues that the words "loyalty" and "fidelity" are "less than
useful"l 53 in answering the question, "What does fiduciary obligation require
one to do?" 54 He prefers "disinterestedness" as the standard, which he
describes as "the elimination of the pursuit of any conflicting interest of the
actor himself."155 This formulation suffers from the same infirmity as the "sole
benefit" and "undivided loyalty" tests, discussed above, and even Birks seems
to recognize that his abstract standard begs for contextualization.1 56
14 8 Robert Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles on the
Duties ofPartners Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997, 999 (1998).
149See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b)(1) (1997) ("A partner's duty of loyalty to the
partnership and the other partners is limited to the following: (1) to account to the
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in
the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner
of partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity. . . .").
150 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (2006) ("An agent has a duty not
to deal with the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with
the agency relationship.").
151 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(b)(3) (2006) ("The duty of
loyalty of a member in a member-managed limited liability company includes the
dut[y] ... to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of the company's
activities before the dissolution of the company.").
152 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000)
("[A] lawyer must ... comply with obligations concerning the client's confidences and
property, avoid impermissible conflicting interests, deal honestly with the client, and not
employ advantages arising from the client-lawyer relationship in a manner adverse to the
client.").
153 Peter Birks, The Content ofFiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 11-12 (2000).
I 54 Id. at 4.
155Id. at 20.
156 Birks examines a case from the High Court of Australia to illustrate the distinction
between "promot[ing] the interests of [the] employer" and "promoting the interests of the
employer disinterestedly." Id. at 21-22 (discussing Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.
(1984) 156 CLR 41 (Austl.)).
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Despite their shortcomings, these attempts to describe the boundaries of
fiduciary obligation through close analysis of abstract standards advance our
understanding. 157 In this Article, however, we are focused on the mechanisms
by which these abstract standards are contextualized. As noted above, our thesis
is that judges often appeal to industry customs and social norms in discerning
the line between compliance and breach. Essentially, these judges are
attempting to distinguish the appropriate pursuit of self-interest from the
inappropriate pursuit ofself-interest.'5 8
This view of fiduciary analysis makes sense of the frequent invocation of
"reasonable expectations" in fiduciary cases. 159 By asking whether a fiduciary
fulfilled the reasonable expectations of the beneficiary, courts are implicitly
endorsing boundary enforcement as the goal of fiduciary law, as "reasonable
expectations" typically would suggest a range of possible actions. Moreover,
the reference to the beneficiary's reasonable expectations may suggest the need
to import industry customs and social norms into the analysis.160 After all, while
the beneficiary may form expectations from the negotiations, often such
157 In addition to the commentators discussed above, see Lyman Johnson, After Enron:
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 38 (2003).
Johnson discussed in depth the disparate definitions of loyalty. Id. Drawing on moral
philosophy, Johnson distinguished the "minimal condition" and the "maximum condition"
for loyalty in corporate law. Id. The "minimal condition" of loyalty requires that the
fiduciary "reject temptation" and that she refrain from "betraying the object of one's
loyalty." Id. He further explained that when courts emphasize a benefit to the fiduciary as a
hallmark of a loyalty breach or the need to avoid self-interest seeking to fulfill the duty of
loyalty, they are describing the minimal condition for loyalty. Id. In contrast, the "maximum
condition" includes "an element of devotion" and "affirmative duties of devotion" as well.
Id. Thus, corporate actors may breach their duty of loyalty even when they obtain no
personal gain as a result of the breach. Thus, simply attempting to determine whether a
fiduciary gained a windfall from his action may not sufficiently account for all breaches of
the duty of loyalty.
158The American Law Institute is proposing a standard for the duty of loyalty in
nonprofit organizations that is framed in similar language. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 310 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) ("The duty
of loyalty requires each governing-board member ... (b) to handle
appropriately ... situations in which the interests of the charity do or might conflict with the
interests of fiduciaries and related persons.").
15 9 See, e.g., Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2000); Berreman v. W. Publ'g
Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929,
934 (Mont. 1982); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (N.C. 1983); Kortum v.
Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 432, 439 (N.D. 2008); McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 156-57
(Utah 2009).
160 We do not intend to suggest that "reasonable expectations" are established
exclusively by reference to industry customs and social norms. One can easily imagine a
novel contracting environment in which industry customs and social norms have not yet
developed. Nevertheless, the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty may have reasonable
expectations of being treated in a certain manner based on statements made or actions taken
during the formation or maintenance of the relationship.
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expectations arise from the normal course of dealing in a particular situation. 161
Although this standard looks to the circumstances of the specific parties to the
agreement, it also involves an analysis of what is customary under the
circumstances. 162
For example, in In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., the New York Court of
Appeals discussed the reasonable expectations analysis in the shareholder
oppression context. 163 The court explained that, in considering an allegation of
oppressive conduct, it must look not only to what the majority shareholders
knew, but also what they "should have known" about the minority shareholders'
expectations.164 The court further counseled that "[m]ajority conduct should not
be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective hopes and
desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled."s65 Thus, a court must look
beyond the actual expectations of the parties to the expectations that would be
customary for similarly situated parties to hold.
Courts also use the notion of "fairness" in a similar manner to evaluate the
boundaries of fiduciary discretion. For example, the Delaware courts use the
"entire fairness" standard to evaluate breach of the duty of loyalty claims. 166
The entire fairness standard has two prongs, fair dealing and fair price, each of
which references industry customs. Fair dealing "embraces questions of when
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders
were obtained."l 67 The goal of this part of the inquiry is to test the challenged
transaction against market transactions. 168
Fair price "relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed" transaction. 169 A fair price is "not a point on a line, but a range of
161 See Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the
Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 989, 993-95 (2001) (explaining
that the reasonable expectations analysis is fundamentally different from an implied-in-fact
contract and that the difference in analyses between contract law and oppression law protects
the parties' interests differently).
162 Harris v. Ahtna, Inc., 107 P.3d 271, 274 (Alaska 2005) ("Reasonable expectations
may be ascertained through the language of the contract, the behavior of the parties, case
law, and any relevant extrinsic evidence."); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387-88
(N.D. 1987) (acknowledging that the subjective understandings of the parties do not end the
analysis).
163In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984).
I64 Id.
165 Id. (The court went on to explain that majority conduct would only be oppressive if it
"substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were . .. reasonable under the
circumstances.").
166 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 475 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
167 Id. at 711.168 Cf Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders,
152 U. PA. L. REv. 785, 798 (2003) (noting "the importance of a process that mirrors a real
arm's-length transaction").
169 Weinberger, 475 A.2d at 711.
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reasonable values." 170 In arriving at that range of values, the Delaware courts
consider "any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable
in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court."'71 As is evident
from this reasoning, the Delaware courts freely refer to industry customs in
evaluating fiduciary action.
Sometimes courts do more than simply apply an abstract standard,
reflecting more openly about the importance of industry customs and social
norms. 172 For example, as Melvin Eisenberg has noted, the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance provides that a court "may
properly take into account ethical considerations that are generally recognized
as relevant to the conduct of business," even if a fiduciary did not benefit from
the transaction. 173 Eisenberg points to the example of United States v.
Bestfoods,174 in which the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether an
action by a dual officer of a parent and a subsidiary took action on behalf of the
parent or on behalf of the subsidiary. The Court reasoned, "the presumption that
an act is taken on behalf of the corporation for whom the officer claims to act is
strongest when the act is perfectly consistent with the norms of corporate
behavior, but wanes as the distance from those accepted norms" increases.17 5
Similarly, the Court held that in determining whether conduct by a parent's
officer involves parental oversight or direct parental control, "[t]he critical
question is whether ... actions . . . by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric
under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility."' 76
The enforcement of industry customs and social norms through fiduciary
law is desirable because it is likely to yield a result closest to the parties'
expectation interests by responding to social change.177 This result will
170 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ.A. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
171 Weinberger, 475 A.2d at 713.
172 In evaluating the reasonableness of trustee compensation, for example, courts are to
consider "local custom." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38 cmt. c(1) (2007).
173 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1265 (citing AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (b)(2) (1994)).
174 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1265 (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55
(1998)).
175 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 70 n.13.
176 Id. at 72.
177 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1, 30-31 (2006) ("The life of the law, including the life of corporate law, is in a constant
state of change in response to social changes. Circumstances change, the social norms
applicable to the conduct of business change, business practices change, concepts of
efficiency and other issues of policy applicable to corporate law change. Sometimes, social
changes indicate that an existing fiduciary obligation should be modified or cut back. An
example is the widespread legislative adoption of exculpatory or shield provisions. Other
times, social changes indicate that a new specific fiduciary obligation should be articulated
because a type of conduct that was once regarded as proper is no longer so regarded.").
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embolden beneficiary action ex ante.178 Of course, some industry customs and
social norms may be undesirable from a societal standpoint.179 And courts
sometimes render decisions in opposition to industry customs and social norms,
though we view these cases as the exceptions that prove the rule.180
We recognize that when courts incorporate social norms into law, they run
the risk of altering the very social norms they are attempting to incorporate.' 8'
For example, Einer Elhauge has argued that the duty of corporate managers to
maximize profit was not socially efficient "because even optimal legal sanctions
are necessarily imperfect and require supplementation by social and moral
sanctions to fully optimize conduct."1 82 He argued that regulating the decisions
of managers through such a duty and subjecting them to shareholder review
178 Smith & Ibrahim. suora note 18. at 1538-39.
179 See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1643 (2001)
(discussing the deference of traditional directors to chief executive officers, which was on
display in Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 51-58 (Del. 1991)).
180 Perhaps the most notorious example of a court standing up to industry customs and
social norms is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864, 874-75 (Del. 1985), in which the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule did not protect a board's
approval of a proposed merger, even though the board was disinterested and independent,
because the directors had failed to inform themselves adequately concerning the intrinsic
value of their company. The board of directors in that case acted like other boards of the
time, but the court found its actions wanting. The reaction to the case was immediate and
harsh. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case,
40 Bus. LAw. 1437, 1455 (1985) (describing the case as "surely one of the worst decisions
in the history of corporate law"); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in
the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985) (noting that the "corporate bar
generally views the decision as atrocious"). In the wake of Van Gorkom, the behavior of
directors changed, and fairness opinions in mergers became "customary." Paul Sweeney,
Who Says It's a Fair Deal?, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 1999, at 44, 45; see also Lynn A.
Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van
Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 675, 688 (2002) ("[C]orporate
law shapes directors' behavior primarily through its 'sermonizing' or 'expressive'
function.").
181 See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing the theory that regulation
has the potential to "crowd out" socially useful norms and customs); see also Bernstein,
supra note 68, at 1769 (discussing U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b): "[W]hile the drafters of the Code
sought to incorporate these norms into the law in an effort to make commercial law more
responsive to and reflective of commercial reality, they failed to recognize that this approach
would fundamentally alter the very reality they sought to reflect, and would do so in ways
that would have undesirable effects on commercial relationships and would undermine the
Code's own stated goals of promoting flexibility in commercial transactions and
'permit[ting] the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties.').
18 2 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 733, 733 (2005).
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would undermine social and moral enforcement because managers are subject
to social and moral sanctions, whereas shareholders are not.18 3
Other authors have disagreed, arguing that law and norms are
interdependent and that, where law and norms conflict, "the legal duty may
eventually alter the substantive norms, or the latter may weaken the norm of
obedience to law, or both." 84 This concept-that law will be more likely to be
adhered to when it mirrors social norms-provides further incentive for
fiduciary law to incorporate social norms.
IV. COMPETITION IN EMPLOYMENT: A CASE STUDY
In this Part, we discuss the principles related above as they apply to
competition in the employment context. We selected competition in
employment as an illustrative topic because the Restatement (Third) of
Employment Law is currently under production by the American Law
Institute, 185 and the tentative drafts have identified several jurisdictional splits,
which represent fundamental differences in conceptions of fiduciary duties in
the employment relationship. No single theoretical framework seems to provide
guidance to courts as they apply fiduciary principles to the employment
relationship, especially in the case of non-managerial employees. 186 We seek to
provide that framework.
As we discussed in Part III above, the role of fiduciary duties is boundary
enforcement. Although the duty to be loyal adheres in every fiduciary
relationship, the scope of that duty varies relative to the amount of discretion
afforded to the fiduciary.187 This insight is especially prominent in the
183Id. at 800 (arguing that a legal duty to maximize profits would entail "the sort of
suboptimal conduct we would get with zero social and moral sanctions").184 Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 533, 564 (2006) ("Liability risk and the norm of obedience to law pull the
manager in the direction of choosing the profit-maximizing course of conduct, while the
substantive norms pull in the other direction."); see also Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83
TEx. L. REv. 1399, 1403 (2005) (arguing that laws perceived as unjust will not necessarily
alter social norms or moral perceptions, but rather that such laws "can generate general
disrespect and increased lawbreaking").
185 Restatement Third, Employment Law, ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
publications.ppage&node id=31 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
186The regulation of employee competition is heavily influenced by agreements not to
compete, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW §§ 8.05-8.07 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2011), and laws governing confidential information, including the law of trade secrets. Id.
§§ 8.02-8.03. As noted above, the duty of loyalty is a doctrine of last resort and, as a result,
may play a less prominent role in the regulation of employee competition than these other
areas of law.
187 1d. § 8.04 cmt. a ("[T]he duty of loyalty applies to all employees, but the scope of the
duty varies with the nature of employment. Because an employee with managerial authority
can often bind the employer by the discretionary exercise of that authority, the scope of that
employee's duty of loyalty is broader than that of an employee who does not exercise such
authority.").
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employment context because of the wide disparity in discretion among non-
managerial employees and high-level managers.' 88 Many courts have referred
to the duty of loyalty for managers as "higher," 89 "heightened," 90 or
"greater."'91 Although some of the case law discussing the variation in the duty
of loyalty may be confusing or difficult to reconcile, 192 we believe these
variations are best understood as referring to differences in levels of discretion.
To demonstrate the boundary enforcement role of fiduciary duties in the
employment context, we call upon the employee in the oft-cited case of
Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke 93 to serve as the model of a lower-level employee.194
Donald Gedicke was an at-will employee of Cameco, Inc., a manufacturer of
food products.195 As traffic manager, Gedicke was responsible for arranging the
shipping of Cameco's products through common carriers to retail stores. 196 His
duties included coordinating shipping schedules, negotiating shipping rates,
supervising warehouse employees, overseeing the shipping process, and
inspecting Cameco's off-site warehouses.197 While carrying out these tasks,
Gedicke became familiar with information that Cameco considered to be
188 Some courts have held that certain non-managerial employees are not fiduciaries. Id.
§ 8.06, reporter's notes (a)(iii) ("Apparently reluctant to endorse a robust fiduciary duty on
all employees, a good number of courts assert that not all employees owe a duty of
loyalty.").
189 See, e.g., Condon Auto Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 604 N.W.2d 587, 600 (Iowa
1999) ("A higher duty of loyalty exists for employees who occupy a position of trust and
confidence than those who occupy a low level task."); Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d
783, 791 (N.J. 1999) (noting that "[a]n officer, director, or key executive ... has a higher
duty than an employee working on a production line").
190 See, e.g., McConaghy v. Sequa Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (D.R.I. 2003)
(holding that controlling owners and corporate managers "had a fiduciary relationship with
these companies, and, as such, had heightened duties of loyalty and care"); Enterprise
Recovery Sys., Inc. v. Salmeron, 927 N.E.2d 852, 865 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) ("[C]orporate
officers owe a heightened fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporate employer. . . .").
191 See, e.g., In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 790 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[t]he critical
fact underlying this 'greater duty of loyalty than is normally required,' was the greater
degree of control that one partner (i.e., the managing or business partner) had over the
operation of the partnership and hence the investment of the other partners"); Huffington v.
Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1976) ("As managing partner of their partnership
enterprise, respondent owed his partners even a greater duty of loyalty than is normally
required.").
192 The Restatement acknowledges an analytical split between courts that are "reluctant
to endorse a robust fiduciary duty on all employees" and those which "either apply a
functional analysis of the duty of loyalty, or simply apply that duty to all employees."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW § 8.01, reporter's notes (a)(iii) (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2011). We believe that most of the analytical confusion surrounding this issue is resolved by
viewing fiduciary duties as boundaries on discretion.
193 724 A.2d 783 (N.J. 1999).






confidential, including the identities of Cameco's customers, suppliers, and
common carriers, as well as rates and delivery routes. 198
Gedicke had discretion to perform a variety of tasks. For example, he might
choose to ship to one customer before another or he might choose to inspect the
off-site warehouses on Thursdays instead of Tuesdays. He might also negotiate
different shipping rates with different customers. Although Cameco could
terminate Gedicke if it were not satisfied with his performance,199 fiduciary law
has nothing to say about the way in which Gedicke exercises his discretion,
unless he does so in a manner that is disloyal to his employer.
The Restatement provides that the exercise of discretion is disloyal when,
among other things, an employee "compet[es] with the employer while
employed by the employer."200 It then develops this boundary by delineating
what does or does not constitute competition by a lower-level employee.201 The
Restatement explains that working for a competitor, soliciting customers for a
competitor, or recruiting employees for a competitor constitutes a breach of the
duty not to compete.202 It also describes situations in which what would
normally be described as competition is not competition for purposes of the
duty of loyalty, including reasonable preparation to compete and
moonlighting.203 Each of these activities seems to be self-interested
competition, but some forms of competition have been continually affirmed as
acceptable by courts. This raises the question we asked above: how should a
court define the boundaries of fiduciary discretion? As discussed above and
illustrated below, courts draw these boundaries with reference to industry
customs and social norms.
In Cameco, the disputed action was Gedicke's decision to start a shipping
company in his off-hours. 204 Gedicke used the skills he had acquired during his
employment at Cameco to arrange shipping for Cameco's competitors. 205
Gedicke often arranged commingled shipments of Cameco's products and the
198 Id
199 Cameco, 724 A.2d at 786-87. Cameco ultimately fired Gedicke for "poor
performance": for failing to conduct off-site warehouse inspections, failing to negotiate
lower freight rates, and allowing too much overtime in his department. Id.
2 0 0 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW § 8.01 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011).
201 Id. § 8.04(c).
202Id. § 8.04(b).
203 Section 8.04(b) explains that competition "does not include reasonable preparation
by an employee or group of employees to compete with the employer." Id. Section 8.04(c)
permits nonmanagerial employees to work for a competitor
as long as the work is not done during time committed to the first employer, does not
involve the use or disclosure of the first employer's confidential information, and does
not cause economic injury to the first employer greater than the injury that would be
caused by any other person working for the competitor.
Id. § 8.04(c).204 Cameco, 724 A.2d at 786.
205 See id.
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products of his own customers. 206 The court, in analyzing whether Gedicke had
breached his duty of loyalty, did so with reference to social norms. In
determining that lower-level employees are permitted to work for competitors
of their employer under some circumstances, the court explained:
A reality of contemporary life is that many families will consist of two wage
earners, one wage earner with two jobs, or both. For some employees,
particularly those earning low or modest incomes, second sources of income
are an economic necessity. For them, a second job or "moonlighting" is the
only way to make ends meet.207
After laying out several context-specific factors to determine whether an
employee has breached his duty of loyalty, the court ultimately determined that
"[a]bsent a governing contractual provision, the judicial task is to search for a
fair and reasonable solution in light of the relevant considerations." 208
Cameco illustrates how a court might derive the substance of fiduciary
duties from industry customs and social norms. The court acknowledged that
not all competition constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty, despite the
general rule, acknowledging that this type of competition is a "reality of
contemporary life."
Another concept in employment law that demonstrates the use of social
norms as content for fiduciary duties is the discussion regarding an etployee's
preparation to compete. The Restatement adopts the rule that "an employee
breaches the duty of loyalty to the employer if, without the employer's
consent ... the employee ... works for a competitor or otherwise competes
with the employer." 209 However, it creates a caveat for "reasonable preparation
by an employee or group of employees to compete with the employer."210
Courts seem to define "reasonable preparation" with reference to social norms.
For example, several courts have drawn the line between appropriate
preparation to compete and inappropriate solicitation of customers or co-
workers by determining whether the contact was more like a solicitation or a
professional courtesy. 211 Courts engage in a fact-specific inquiry,212 commonly
206Id The court seemed to accept Gedicke's testimony that this type of "commingled"
shipping is customary and that Cameco benefitted from reduced shipping rates as a result of
sharing space with Gedicke's customers. See id.
207Id. at 789.208Id. at 791. Under the facts of this case, the court affirmed the appellate court's
determination that the employer had established a prima facie case against the employee for
breach of the duty of loyalty. Id. at 792.209 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW § 8.04(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011).210Id. § 8.04(b).
211 See, e.g., Warwick Grp., Inc. v. Cipolla, No. C.A. NO. 86-2259, 1986 WL 714207, at
*3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1986) (determining that "the announcement sent out by the
defendants is not so much a direct solicitation of business as a notice of professional
association and change of address"); see also Aetna Bldg. Maint. Co. v. West, 246 P.2d 11,
15 (Cal. 1952); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 847 (Pa. 1957)
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citing to standards that implicate social norms, such as honesty and fair
dealing.213 Courts also seem to have similar social norms in mind when making
these determinations as they do in the moonlighting context. For example, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged that "courts have been receptive
to the view that every person has or at least ought to have the right to ameliorate
his socio-economic status by exercising a maximum degree of personal freedom
in choosing employment." 214
Another context in which the content of fiduciary duties is supplied by
industry customs and social norms is the discussion of what constitutes a
corporate opportunity for purposes of employee competition with an employer.
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court, in finding that there was no corporate
opportunity, looked to "[c]ommon sense" and "practical advantage." 2 15
Similarly, in the not-for-profit context, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division looked to fairness in determining that a fiduciary misappropriated a
corporate opportunity.216
All of these examples demonstrate that the duty of loyalty acts as a
boundary on employee discretion and courts do not simply apply abstract
(discussing the issue of professional courtesy when soliciting co-workers: "The systematic
inducing of employees to leave their present employment and take work with another is
unlawful when the purpose of such enticement is to cripple and destroy an integral part of a
competitive business organization rather than to obtain the services of particularly gifted or
skilled employees.").
2 12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW § 8.04, reporter's notes (b) (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2011) ("As in the context of determining what constitutes mere preparation,
determining what constitutes going beyond mere announcement is, however, a fact-intensive
inquiry."); see Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 935 (Cal. 1966) (noting that
"[nlo ironclad rules as to the type of conduct which is permissible can be stated"); see also
Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999) (noting that "[t]he contexts giving
rise to claims of employee disloyalty are so varied that they preclude the mechanical
application of abstract rules of law").
213 See, e.g., Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 492 (Colo. 1989)
("Underlying the duty of loyalty arising out of the employment relationship is the policy
consideration that commercial competition must be conducted through honesty and fair
dealing."); Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978) ("Fairness dictates
that an employee not be permitted to exploit the trust of his employer so as to obtain an
unfair advantage in competing with the employer in a matter concerning the latter's
business.").
214 Maryland Metals, 382 A.2d at 569.
215 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 P.3d 953, 958 (Idaho 2003) ("Common sense suggests that
expanding a closely held corporation made up of four shareholders including contentious ex-
spouses and estranged sisters, is not practical. The acrimony among the few shareholders of
Summer Wind not only speaks to whether a new opportunity would have been of practical
advantage, but also calls into question the viability of the corporation as a whole.").
2 16 Am. Baptist Churches of Metro. N.Y. v. Galloway, 271 A.D.2d 92, 97 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (determining that "it would be unfair and counterproductive for a charitable
organization to have no recourse against a dishonest fiduciary who thwarts the
organization's endeavors and renders futile the expenditures of time and money invested in
developing the project").
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standards to factual situations to determine whether an employee has breached
his duty of loyalty. Rather, courts draw the boundary between appropriate and
inappropriate self-interest with reference to social norms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Discretion is part of the design of fiduciary relationships. Judge Easterbrook
and Professor Fischel have said that fiduciary relationships are typified by the
hiring of knowledge and expertise,217 and in these circumstances, "there is not
much they can write down." 218 Given the impossibility of predicting the future,
the party granting discretion makes a considered choice to invest the
counterparty with power, and the counterparty is enticed to enter the
iilaiunship, at least in part, based on the expectation ot using this power. In
evaluating the exercise of this discretion, courts should employ fiduciary law in
the task of boundary enforcement.
The notion of boundary enforcement suggests that courts should respect the
reasonable exercise of discretion by a fiduciary. Most courts seem to understand
this point, recognizing that they should not substitute their own judgments for
the judgments of fiduciaries, unless the fiduciaries are not to be trusted because
they are acting inappropriately in a self-interested manner. Courts should not
attempt to justify overriding a fiduciary's discretion simply because someone
else would exercise the discretion differently. The nature of discretion is that
reasonable people might come to different conclusions.
In deciding how to define the boundaries of fiduciary discretion, courts
often turn to industry customs and social norms, either implicitly (by applying
standards that require reference to industry customs and social norms) or
explicitly. We believe that this appeal to industry customs and social norms is a
sensible way to meet the reasonable expectations of the parties. This approach
emboldens people to enter into fiduciary relationships and mitigates
opportunism within those relationships.
2 17 Paul Miller takes issue with this characterization of fiduciary relationships, arguing,
"Expertise is not a de jure or de facto qualification of fiduciaries." Miller, supra note 4, at
982. Perhaps Easterbrook and Fischel should have said that the beneficiary hires the
fiduciary's judgment or discretion, but their main point is well taken: a fiduciary is expected
to make decisions in circumstances that cannot reasonably be predicted, so the contract will
be incomplete.2 18 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 426.
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